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[Vol. 156: 331 PENNumbra and Katyal's argument on the nature of property law's right to exclude. After summarizing recent efforts to understand the right to exclude, I describe Peñalver and Katyal's argument that outlaw behavior has a special and socially productive function in property law, 4 and explain the connection between their article and the right to exclude. I conclude this Response by proffering evidence that Meat Loaf may have audited a first-year property law course, or at least that he incorporated insights about property law into his music.
I. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE: FAVORITE CHILD, OR ONLY CHILD?
The right to exclude has long been considered the centerpiece of property law. Since Blackstone defined property as the "sole and despotic dominion . . . over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe,"
5 the right has remained in the minds of property scholars "the sine qua non" of what property is. 6 Despite Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's and A.M. Honoré's efforts 7 to bundle it with the rights to use, possess, and transfer property, 8 the right to exclude has enjoyed an elevated status in relation to its fellow sticks both by the Court 9 and by its commentators.
10
4 Id. at 1098 (" [T] he apparent stability and order that property law provides owe much to the destabilizing role of the lawbreaker, who occasionally forces shifts of entitlements and laws.").
5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2. 6 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) ; see also Richard A. Epstein, Rights and "Rights Talk," 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106 , 1109 (1992 (book review) ("What is wrong with a system of absolute rights that allows individuals to exclude some persons on a whim and admit others only by mutual consent? By and large, nothing.").
7 See J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712-13 (1996) (indicating that the "bundle of rights" slogan derives from a combination of Hohfeld's analysis of rights and from Honoré's description of incidents of ownership).
8 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 81 (6th ed. 2006) (indicating that the bundle of property rights consists of "the right to possess, the right to use, the right to exclude, [and] the right to transfer"). In addition to these four, Lior Strahilevitz has argued persuasively that Black's Law Dictionary, and by extension jurists with an interest in unpacking property's bundle, may have erred when omitting a fifth right, "the right to destroy," from its definition of "owner." See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 790-91 (2005 Recent scholarship has focused on disaggregating the elements of the right.
11 These efforts at disaggregation have complemented efforts to determine whether the right is not only the centerpiece, but the only piece, of property law. 12 Of these latter efforts, perhaps the most radical has been put forward by Professor Peñalver himself, who has argued famously that "theorists have generally overemphasized the degree to which private property enables owners to escape from communal coercion."
13 Instead, Professor Peñalver favors the conception of property not as exit, but as entrance. He has argued that most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property").
10 See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights To Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 REV. , 1836 REV. (2006 (noting that the right has been deemed "foremost among the property rights"); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND CONSERVATION 53 (2006) (arguing that "the cornerstone of private property is the right to exclude anyone and anything from your property that you don't want on your property").
11 See, for example, Strahilevitz, supra note 10, at 1837, in which the author famously unpacked the right to exclude into four component parts:
(1) The Hermit's Right (the right to keep everyone off the resource owner's property); (2) The Bouncer's Right (the right to admit prospective entrants selectively to the resource owner's property); (3) The Exclusionary Vibe (the right to convey messages about who is welcome or unwelcome on the property, enforced primarily by social and psychological sanctions); and (4) The Exclusionary Amenity (the right to embed polarizing and costly club goods on the resource owner's property in order to sort between desirable and undesirable entrants).
See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016222 (arguing that the right to exclude is best understood not so much as a "right," but as a normative device, analogous to the promise in contract law, in which the right to exclude derives from property law's norm of resource inviolability).
12 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 6, at 754 (defining property as "the right to exclude others from valuable resources, no more and no less"). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions 1 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 07-38, 2007) , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014161 (setting forth a theory of property law that accounts for more than the right to exclude, or any other single right, and instead accounts for "(1) the number of owners, (2) the scope of owner's dominion and (3) asset configuration"); Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 REV. , 1231 REV. , 1280 REV. -96 (2006 (defending the argument that property law should develop an entitlement scheme to respond to associational collective action problems, such as the concentration of poverty in metropolitan areas, and that the absence of such a scheme in current property law derives from a dichotomous understanding of property law, as either belonging to everyone or no one); Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 377 (2003) (understanding the right to exclude as an "essential but insufficient" element of the meaning of property law).
13 Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 REV. , 1893 REV. (2005 .
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 156: 331 PENNumbra property law is not an institution that excludes, but is instead "an institution that binds individuals together into normative communities." 14 II. THE PRODUCTIVE ROLE OF PROPERTY'S OUTLAW Professors Peñalver and Katyal view their article as one that builds upon a dialogic conception of property, which they and others have developed. 15 In Property Outlaws, Professors Peñalver and Katyal argue that intentional property outlaws-the "little people" and "have-nots" who "cannot afford to file civil suits or whose voice in the legislative process is too weak to attract the attention of lawmakers and thus unable to wrest a change in property relations from existing entitlements"-have "repeatedly played a powerful and visible role as catalysts for needed legal change."
16
The history that Professors Peñalver and Katyal reconstruct, in which outlaws have "played a key role in fostering both symbolic and substantive evolution within the law of private ownership,"
17 is persuasive because it is both compelling and intuitive. Professors Peñalver and Katyal organize their article by identifying three categories of property outlaws that have helped to make property law "a dynamic institution that is broadly reflective of evolving community values, as opposed to a fixed set of entitlements rooted in abstract moral and economic theory."
18 Those categories are (a) "acquisitive outlaws," (b) "expressive outlaws," and (c) "intersectional outlaws."
19
Acquisitive outlaws break property laws in order to acquire a piece of property, typically the piece toward which their lawbreaking is directed.
20
Examples include adverse possessors and those who enter land under the doctrine of necessity. Expressive outlaws, like the black students in Greenville, South Carolina, who sat in at segregated 21 did not trespass in order to appropriate the lunch counters in which they sat. In fact, even if the sit-in participants would have been allowed to eat at the lunch counters where they were sitting, their goals would not have been met without the passage of general prohibitions against segregated lunch counters. 22 Intersectional outlaws break property laws for motives that are both acquisitive and expressive. As Professors Peñalver and Katyal describe, the urban squatters of the 1970s were motivated not only by their desire to protest the government's failure to convert publicly owned, abandoned property into much-needed low-income housing, but also by their desire to own the dilapidated building in which they had squatted but which they could not afford to purchase.
23
Each of the acquisitive, expressive, and intersectional outlaws highlighted by Professors Peñalver and Katyal has engineered social change. The outlaw's socially productive role in property law is different from her role in other areas of law. In property law, "outlaws are able to offer us a concrete vision of their alternative conception of the law. The property outlaw therefore provides the official decision maker with actual, rather than hypothetical, circumstances under which to evaluate the degree of her commitment to the status quo." 24 Moreover, "American property law is full of doctrines whose principal purpose appears to be the hindrance of nonconsensual alterations in existing property allocations and entitlements." 25 In light of the tension between stagnant property law doctrines and the positive social changes that property outlaws have historically engineered, Peñalver and Katyal argue that property law "should be careful not to protect property rights in such a way as to preclude outlaws from productively violating existing official legal norms." 26 Thus, property law should "retain a certain flexibility" 27 when dealing with property outlaws.
21 See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (holding that convicting black students for failing to leave a restaurant's whites-only lunch counter violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
22 See Peñalver and Katyal, supra note 3, at 1115 ("[S]it-ins were aimed at achieving broad legal transformation of the social meaning of public accommodation, one that would permanently rearrange the property rights of all owners . . . ."). 23 See id. at 1123-26 (explaining that city governments would either auction publicly owned properties to the highest bidder, or else hold them in their dilapidated states, despite strong local demands for low-income housing Their proposals center on expanding existing tools within property law so that sanctions in certain contexts can be reconfigured in proportion to the productive value of certain outlaw behavior. For example, they propose shortening the timeframe during which a trespasser can gain title to a tract of land through adverse possession, 30 and requiring courts to treat economic necessity in the same way they treat necessity caused by natural disaster.
III. PROPERTY OUTLAWS AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
In identifying property outlaws as positive agents of social change, Peñalver and Katyal explore an important and fascinating phenomenon. Moreover, the authors convincingly reconstruct the history of our nation's most infamous property lawbreakers in arguing for the incorporation of selective outlaw behavior into the stubborn and socially unreflective institution of property law. Their work is illuminating, and its effects on the theory and practice of property law are sure to be profound and innumerable. This Response highlights in particular how the authors' ideas impact the nature of the right to exclude in relation to its fellow sticks in the bundle of property rights.
A. The Connection Between Outlaws and the Right To Exclude
Each of Peñalver and Katyal's outlaws is motivated differently, but all of them violate, and have violated, property law in socially productive ways. The acquisitive adverse possessor, the expressive sit-in participant, and the intersectional urban squatter have each broken 28 Id. at 1150. 29 Id. at 1151. 30 See id. at 1171 (arguing that adverse possession requirements, like the customary seven-year notice requirement, are outdated considering that modern advances have made property monitoring much easier). 31 See id. at 1173-74 ("In a predominantly market-based economy that relies almost exclusively upon consensual transactions to get property from one person to another, economic necessity can be as dire an evil as catastrophic flooding.").
2008]
RULE OF (OUT)LAW 337
property laws. More specifically, these outlaws have each invaded an owner's right to exclude.
32
For the overwhelming number of subscribers to property law's axiomatic bundle-of-rights theory, 33 as well as those who favor the "sovereignty thesis," 34 which elevates in importance the right to exclude above other sticks in the bundle, this shared characteristic may have profound implications for the fundamental conception of property law.
B. Anything, but Not "That": The Problem with Situating the Right To Exclude in the Bundle
Even the staunchest proponents of property law's sovereignty thesis concede that the right to exclude does admit exceptions. Cases where courts have awarded damages or issued injunctions on the basis of an owner's right to exclude must be reconciled with equal and opposite reactive cases where courts have not. What becomes difficult about admitting exceptions to the right to exclude is explainingdespite those exceptions-the right's status as property law's most important or defining right. And, as preeminent property scholars have noted recently, As always when one has a basic rule (the right to exclude) subject to exceptions, there is a question whether the exceptions should be stated in a rule-like fashion, or whether the whole issue (right to exclude or not to exclude) should be resolved in a case-by-case fashion with more attention to the balance of interests in each case. 
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The right to exclude is, of course, riddled with exceptions. In this way it is no different from many rules. However, much as Meat Loaf's statement that he "wo[uld]n't do that" would not have mystified listeners had he not said earlier that he "would do anything for love," 36 the right to exclude's exceptions may not have caused such a stir in the property literature had it not been touted in the courts and on the pages of law journals as property's number one right.
Property casebooks often cover the right to exclude by discussing two conflicting seminal cases, Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.
37 and State v. Shack. 38 In Jacque, defendant Steenberg Homes wanted to deliver a mobile home via the easiest route, which happened to lie across Harvey and Lois Jacque's snow-covered field. The Jacques were "an elderly couple . . . [who] were sensitive about allowing others on their land because they had lost property valued at over $10,000 to other neighbors in an adverse possession action in the mid-1980's." 39 As a result of their sensitivity, the Jacques repeatedly refused Steenberg Homes's requests to move the home across their farm field. Even offers to pay the Jacques in exchange for the right to move the home across their land were refused.
40 Steenberg Homes's employees ultimately ignored these refusals, and carried the home using a bobcat through the Jacques' snow-covered field to their neighbor's lot. 41 Though no damages could be calculated as a result of Steenberg Homes's intentional trespass, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that "in certain situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, which may be minimal, but in the loss of the individual's right to exclude others from his or her property."
42
In short, the Jacque court concluded that intentional trespass causes an inherent harm to landowners, and that by failing to award punitive damages to the Jacques, the court would "send[] the wrong message to Steenberg Homes and any others who contemplate trespassing on the land of another."
43 Steenberg Homes's conduct was, in the eyes of the Jacque court, "egregious" 44 [a] man's right in his real property of course is not absolute. It was a maxim of the common law that one should so use his property as not to injure the rights of others. Although hardly a precise solvent of actual controversies, the maxim does express the inevitable proposition that rights are relative and there must be an accommodation when they meet. Hence it has long been true that necessity, private or public, may justify entry upon the lands of another.
48
In light of the relativity of property rights, the Shack court weighed the interests of the migrant workers who lived on the landowner's farm against the landowner's right to exclude individuals who could help them. Because " [p] Of course, a rule that admits exceptions is not unusual, whether in property or another area of law. However, two principal factors make exceptions to the right to exclude stranger than other exceptions. First, the hyperbolic characterization of the importance of the right to exclude in cases like Jacque, Kaiser Aetna, and Loretto, 53 where courts have privileged it over a competing interest, seems not to contemplate anything but an absolute right.
Second, the right to exclude's exceptions involve cases in which a property right (e.g., an owner's right to exclude) is weighed against a non-property right (e.g., the right to the preservation of life during a natural disaster as in Ploof, or the right to free speech as in PruneYard 54 ). One might attribute this phenomenon to the fact that, in general, non-property rights trump property rights. However, this approach to the right to exclude's exceptions is problematic for at least two reasons. First, to say that the law often cares more about protecting people than it does about protecting property is both overly simple and inaccurate. While at one point the purpose of criminal laws aimed at protecting property rights was to "defend[] society against [a] breach of the peace, rather than protect[] individual property rights," 55 that purpose has evolved over time toward the general protection of property rights. 56 Second, even if it was true that the law, as a general matter, favored non-property rights over property rights, what remains unexplained is why the right to exclude, in particular moored his ship during a storm, and from which the dock owner unmoored the ship, causing the ship to be driven onto the shore and the people and cargo on it to be tossed into the water).
52 See Laura S. Underkuffler, Response, Lessons from Outlaws, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 262, 267 (2007) , http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/ Underkuffler.pdf ("The underlying problem that theorists and others face is that property embodies a deep and inherent paradox. On the one hand, property by its very nature embodies conscious, brutal, distributive decisions. . . . And yet-and here is the paradox-protection is also the essence of property.").
53 See cases cited supra note 9. 469, 519-20 (1976) (contending that this evolution was part of a process of "classifying all crimes as intrusions against specific socially protected interests"); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Response, Property In-Laws, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 279, 287 (2007) , http:// www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Garnett.pdf ("It may be the case that most trespasses are relatively minor offenses . . . . But, all the same, . . . most wars are fought over territory. Property does matter, as centuries of battles, large and small, to defend it show.").
